Les multinationales ont longtemps été reconnues comme des piliers importants de l'économie canadienne, puisque ces entreprises sont responsables de la majorité des exportations du pays et d'une part importante de l'emploi. En même temps, selon une opinion largement répandue, les multinationales seraient moins ancrées dans l'économie canadienne et auraient par conséquent plus tendance à procéder à des délocalisa-tions : c'est cette perception que les auteurs tentent de vérifier dans cet article, grâce à des combinaisons de données canadiennes au niveau des entreprises. Les résultats montrent que les multinationales (étrangères et canadiennes) ont effectivement plus tendance à procéder à des délocalisations, mais que cela n'est pas nécessairement dû au fait qu'elles sont moins ancrées dans l'économie canadienne. Les auteurs observent également différentes associations entre les délocalisations et certaines caractéristiques des entreprises (dont la productivité) selon le type de délocalisation (intra-entreprise ou inter-entreprise, par exemple) et la nature des activités délocalisées (certains types de services ou la production de biens, par exemple).
Introduction
Canadian policy-makers and the public have always had mixed feelings about multinational enterprises (MNEs; Hejazi, 2010; Wang, 2014) . On one hand, many recognize that MNEs are important pillars of Canada's national economy, accounting for the majority of its exports and an important share of employment. On the other hand, the widespread perception is that MNEs are less rooted in the local economy and therefore do not take the interests of the Canadian people to heart. This mixed perception of MNEs has also been at the front and centre of the debate about the impact of offshoring on the Canadian economy. Many trade skeptics have raised the concern that offshoring hurts the Canadian economy by leading to deindustrialization, job destruction, and downward wage pressure. MNEs have been particularly blamed in this regard because they are considered those most likely to move jobs from one country to another purely on the basis of cost calculations (Feinberg and Keane 2009) .
Little economic analysis has been conducted to validate these claims, however, making it difficult for Canadian policy-makers to act in a well-informed fashion. Many key questions surrounding the topic remain unanswered. What portion of Canadian firms conduct offshoring? Are MNEs more likely than local firms to conduct value doi:10.3138/cpp.2016-069chain activities offshore? If this is the case, why? Does it depend on the type of MNE (foreign controlled vs. Canadian headquartered)? Do MNEs primarily offshore to their own subsidiaries (intrafirm) or to external partners?
In this article, we aim to gain new insights into these issues. We start off by reviewing recent theoretical developments in the field of international trade and use this overview to set up several propositions relating to multinationals and offshoring. Next, we link data from four firm-level databases compiled by Statistics Canada (the Survey of Innovation and Business Strategy [SIBS] , Longitudinal Employment Analysis Program [LEAP] , General Index of Financial Information [GIFI] , and Business Register [BR] ) to empirically investigate the hypotheses.
Our article is organized as follows. In the next section, we review the related literature and develop several hypotheses. The third section describes the data, and the fourth explains our research methods. The results of our analysis are presented in fifth section; the final section, our conclusion.
Hypothesis Development
Our article builds on recent literature in the field of international trade that investigates the motives for companies to conduct offshoring. The starting point is that the production process of a good or a service consists of a sequence of activities or tasks that need to be combined (Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg 2008 ; Van Assche forthcoming). The production of each task, in turn, requires a mix of resources (labour inputs, technology, fixed assets, working capital, and various types of information), and this resource mix varies along different stages of the value chain. Activities such as research and development, for example, require relatively more skilled labour, whereas more standardized tasks such as production assembly generally need relatively more unskilled labour. In line with the classical theory of comparative advantage, firms thus have the incentive to reduce their costs and maximize their profits by offshoring those value chain activities in which the home country does not have a comparative advantage to other countries where they can be carried out most effectively (Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg 2008) .
There are substantial fixed costs involved with offshoring a task, however, that negatively affect a firm's willingness to conduct an activity overseas. Firms, for example, face significant search and development costs to either set up a foreign subsidiary or find an appropriate foreign partner. They also need to spend considerable efforts and resources to adjust the production process of the task to local regulations and institutions. Furthermore, they need to constantly coordinate and monitor the various value chain activities that are separated geographically, which is significantly more expensive than doing so locally (Leamer and Storper 2001) . If sufficiently large, these fixed offshoring costs can entice firms to keep the production of tasks at home.
A key insight from the recent trade literature is that the fixed cost of offshoring affects a firm's willingness to offshore differently depending on its characteristics. Building on a seminal article by Melitz (2003) , Antràs and Helpman (2004) show that if companies differ in their productivity and face identical fixed costs, only the more productive firms can profitably jump over the fixed cost hurdle of offshoring, whereas less productive firms remain better off producing at home. This prediction has been backed up by ample empirical evidence that Japanese, American, and French firms that offshore tend to have a higher productivity than those that source locally (Defever and Toubal 2013; Kurz 2006; Tomiura 2007 ). 1 A point that has been explored in less depth, however, is that firms may also differ in their fixed cost of offshoring. 2 In other words, one can expect that some types of firms have lower fixed offshoring costs than others. This may be because they are more familiar with the capabilities of firms and subsidiaries in overseas locations than are others, thus providing them with a lower fixed cost for search and development (Ma and Van Assche 2016) , or they may use a more advanced communication system that allows for easier and cheaper coordination across geographically dispersed business activities. For example, a growing number of companies currently rely on sophisticated computer-aided design technologies and business-to-business systems to share codified information between value chain partners. Using US firm-level data, Fort (2016) indeed finds that the adoption of computer-aided design software facilitates fragmentation by lowering the costs of communicating design specifications across locations. Such variations in fixed costs are important because they allow us to develop hypotheses regarding which type of firms are more likely to conduct offshoring.
MNEs (both Canadian and foreign headquartered) are the first type of firm that can be expected to have lower fixed offshoring costs than purely domestic firms. By definition, MNEs consist of a group of dispersed organizations that are located in multiple countries. Because they already have operations overseas, they are more in tune with the conditions in foreign countries and are thus likely to face a lower cost in searching for the appropriate location to offshore. In addition, they often face lower costs to relocate production because they can simply offshore to their own subsidiaries overseas. Many multinational firms strategically set up a production system that allows for a more flexible reallocation of production in case of adverse changes in a S2 Tang and Van Assche specific country's costs (Kogut and Kulatilaka 1994) . If, for example, the local currency appreciates sharply, production of the good can be smoothly moved to a foreign plant. There is some empirical evidence that such a multiplant strategy allows multinational firms to reduce relocation costs. Belderbos and Zou (2007) and Chung et al. (2010) show that Japanese multinational firms use the flexibility created by their multiplant network to adjust affiliate employment in response to labour cost changes and country-specific business cycle fluctuations. This leads to our first hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1: All else equal, multinational firms are more likely to conduct offshoring than purely domestic firms.
A second type of firm that one can expect to have a lower fixed cost of offshoring than purely domestic firms is foreign-controlled firms. Given their heritage, foreign-controlled firms are more familiar with the abilities of firms and subsidiaries in their home country, with which they share a common cultural understanding, references, and norms (Ma and Van Assche 2016) . This may reduce the search and development costs of finding an appropriate partner offshore, particularly in their home country. In addition, they have the option to relocate production to their own subsidiary or headquarter abroad. Thus, our second hypothesis is as follows:
Hypothesis 2: All else equal, foreign-controlled firms are more likely to conduct offshoring than domestic firms.
Data
To empirically test our hypotheses, we construct a firmlevel data set by linking four micro-level databases compiled by Statistics Canada. We list the variables extracted from each database in the Appendix. Here we provide a brief description of each database.
Survey of Innovation and Business Strategy Data
The main data for this analysis come from the SIBS, collected and compiled by the Canadian government agencies Industry Canada, Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada, and Statistics Canada. SIBS is a sample-based survey that provides detailed qualitative information about an enterprise's business structure and operational activities. The targeted population consists of enterprises in Canada with more than 20 employees and revenues of at least $250,000 in 14 sectors at the two-digit North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) level from 11 to 56. SIBS surveyed 4,228 firms in 2009 and 4,467 firms in 2012; 1,279 firms were surveyed in both time periods (see Table 1 ). 3 The database captures both domestic firms and multinational firms. Among the observed firms in SIBS, 31 percent and 27 percent of them are multinationals (i.e., with either a foreign head office or a foreign subsidiary or both) in 2009 and 2012, respectively. 4 In 2012, the IPAS sector (information and cultural industries; professional, scientific, and technical services; and administrative and support, waste management, and remediation services) has the highest percentage of multinational firms, followed by the non-durable and durable manufacturing sectors.
Important for the purposes of this study, the survey provides detailed information about a firm's global value chain management practices. Specifically, it documents whether a company conducts a certain business activity offshore and indicates the type of business activity: production of goods, provision of services, or other business services such as after-sale services, information and communications technology (ICT) services or other professional services. Table 2 shows that 38 percent and 36 percent of the firms observed in SIBS conducted a business activity offshore in 2009 and 2012, respectively. 5 As expected, manufacturing firms had the highest percentage of firms undertaking offshoring, followed by IPAS.
SIBS further distinguishes between two types of offshore activities: intrafirm or interfirm. A Canadian-based company conducts intrafirm offshoring if the business activity performed abroad is conducted by a subsidiary of the same company; it performs interfirm offshoring if the business activity abroad is conducted by an independent third party. Table 3 reports the number of observed firms engaged in intra-and interfirm offshoring in specific business activities. It is important to point out that a company may conduct both intra-and interfirm offshoring at the same time. Interestingly, more firms in SIBS engage in intrafirm offshoring than in interfirm offshoring, especially for service activities.
SIBS contains 1,279 firms for which there is information for both 2009 and 2012. Table 4 
Other Firm Data
The main aim of this article is to investigate how firm characteristics are related to a firm's offshoring status. To conduct our analysis, we have linked the SIBS data with three other firm-level databases compiled by Statistics Canada to obtain both balance sheet information and statistics on the production inputs and output of the companies observed in SIBS. We provide here a brief discussion of the three data sets.
The BR (2000 BR ( -2012 provides information on the founding date and the country of control for each enterprise. 6 The database is the central repository for information on businesses in Canada. Used as the principal frame for the economic statistics program at Statistics Canada, it maintains a complete, up-to-date, and unduplicated list of all active businesses in Canada that have a corporate income tax (T2) account, are an employer, or have a goods and services account.
GIFI (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) collects financial statement and balance sheet information from each firm when it files a T2 Corporation Income Tax Return. In particular, we extract from this data set a firm's total sales of goods and services as a measure of gross output, total tangible capital assets for measuring physical capital, and net income before taxes and extraordinary items to measure physical capital compensation. To derive a company's use of intermediate inputs, we follow Gu and Lafrance (2014) and measure it as total sales minus labour compensation (payroll), which we discuss next, and capital compensation (approximated by net income before taxes and extraordinary items). (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) contains annual payroll and employment information for each employer business in Canada. In addition, it provides information about the structure of each firm, such as whether the firm is a single-or multiple-establishment firm. The information in LEAP is generated from the annual statements of remuneration paid (T4 slips) that Canadian businesses are required to issue to their employees for tax purposes. For this study, we extract a firm's individual labour unit. This employment measure is closer to a head countevery individual who received at least one T4 slip in a given year. If individuals worked for different firms during the year, their 1.0 individual labour unit is split proportionately across firms according to the share of their total annual payroll earned in each. 7 Average wage rate in a company is measured by the payroll per employee (individual labour unit).
To ensure comparison over time, it is necessary to deflate the variables associated with the production function. Deflators at the firm level are not available, so we use detailed industry deflators based on the KLEMS database. In particular, total sales, physical capital assets, payroll per employee, and derived intermediate inputs at the firm level are deflated by gross output, capital stock, value added, and intermediate input deflators at the 41 NAICS-based industry level.
The linked data set allows us to obtain various estimates of a firm's performance. Labour productivity is measured as real gross output (deflated total sales) per employee. Multifactor productivity (MFP) is calculated as the residual of real gross output minus contributions from capital, labour, and intermediate inputs. 8 Profitability is defined as net income before taxes and extraordinary items, divided by total sales. 9 To ensure appropriate analyses, in this article we include in the linked data set only firms that have positive employment, total sales, payroll, total tangible assets, and net income (before tax and extraordinary items). In addition, we exclude firms whose net income is more than total sales. 10 As a result, the number of observations in our final linked data set for economic performance analysis is reduced to about half the number of observations in the SIBS data file. 
Methods
The goal of our empirical analysis is to analyze whether firms with certain firm characteristics are more likely to conduct offshoring. We conduct our analysis in two steps. In the first step, we investigate whether a firm's offshoring status is positively related to its productivity. For this purpose, we follow the commonly used CobbDouglas production function and set up the following basic regression model: 11
where the dependent variable Y it represents a firm i's output in period t; L it , K it , and M it are the production inputs labour, capital, and intermediate inputs, which are deflated using detailed industry deflators; O it is a dummy variable related to offshoring status (1 for offshoring and 0 otherwise); X it is a vector of control variables associated with firm characteristics; I it is a vector of industry dummies at the 35-industry level; T i , 2010 is a year dummy for 2012; and e it is the error term. Our analysis also includes the following firm characteristics X it as control variables in the analysis: firm age, firm structure, country of control, multinationals, and exporting and attempting to export. We consider them in turn and discuss their expected relation with productivity. Baldwin and Gu (2005) find that multinationals tend to be more productive than national firms for reasons such as flexible production organization, better access to production resources, advanced technologies and products, and better management practices. We therefore expect that multinational status is positively related to a firm's productivity.
Multinationals

Young Firms
We consider a firm to be young if it is less than 6 years old. Liu and Tang (2017) show that survival entrants take about 5 years to become as productive as incumbents because it takes time for young firms to overcome some unfavourable conditions associated with start-ups (e.g., demand deficit, scale, learning by doing, and startup costs). We expect the coefficient for young firms to be negative.
Foreign Controlled
Studies show that foreign-controlled firms in Canada are significantly more productive than Canadian-controlled firms because they are more innovative and benefit from advanced technology and superior managerial practices than their parents (Rao, Souare, and Wang 2009; Tang and Rao 2003) . A positive coefficient is thus expected. Baldwin and Gu (2006) find that firms with a multiestablishment structure are more productive than standalone firms because of economies of scale (Baldwin and Gu 2006) , and we thus expect the coefficient for multiestablishment firms to be positive.
Multiestablishment Firms
Exporting or Attempting to Export
Exporters have consistently been found to be more productive than non-exporters (Bernard, Jensen, and Lawrence 1995; Bernard and Jensen 1999; Kugler and Verhoogen 2009; Mayer and Ottaviano 2007) . A positive coefficient is therefore expected.
Finally, year dummies are introduced to capture business cycle effects and industry dummies to capture industry-specific effects resulting from differences in financial and technological opportunities across different industries.
It is important to point out that our estimation method may face a reverse causality problem. As mentioned earlier, a positive relation between offshoring and productivity can be caused by the self-selection of more productive firms into offshoring. Because it is difficult to find appropriate instrumental variables, in the discussion of the results we talk not of effects but rather of relations.
In a second step, we evaluate which type of firms are most likely to conduct offshoring. To empirically test possible determinants of a firm's decision to conduct a business activity offshore, we specify a model that estimates the probability of offshoring as a function of a series of variables related to a firm's structure and past performance and a set of industry and year fixed effects. The equation is estimated as a binary logit model as follows:
where Prob(Offshoring ¼ 1) denotes the probability that a firm i engages in a type of offshoring (intrafirm, interfirm) in year t and Prob(Offshoring ¼ 0) is the probability of the firm not undertaking the type of offshoring in year t (being a reference); X it is a set of characteristics of a firm's structure, including the location of the foreign head office (e.g., United States, Europe, or Asia Pacific), the location of a foreign subsidiary (e.g., United States, Europe, or Asia Pacific), firm size, firm age, multiestablishment status, country of control, and exporting status; Z it-1 is a lagged performance measure, indicated by productivity (we have only included lagged productivity to limit potential reverse causality problems); I i is a vector of 35 industry dummies; D i,2012 is the dummy variable for 2012 (with 2009 being the reference); and e it is the error term. The estimation will shed light on the important factors that influence offshoring, directly testing our two hypotheses.
Results
Summary Descriptive Statistics
We start off by presenting a snapshot of facts relating a firm's offshoring status to its performance. In Table 5 , we present mean differences in the economic performance of non-offshorers and offshorers in various industries during 2009 and 2012. The results show that offshorers are generally larger, pay higher wages, are more productive, and are more profitable than non-offshorers. In terms of capital intensity, the evidence seems to be mixed. Offshorers were on average slightly less capital intensive than non-offshorers in 2009, mainly driven by non-manufacturing firms. In 2012, however, it was clear that offshorers were more capital intensive than non-offshorers. Table 6 reports the estimation results of Equation (1). Several interesting findings emerge. First and foremost, firms that conduct offshoring are more productive (in terms of multifactor productivity) than non-offshorers (regression 1), and this remains true after controlling for multinational status, multiestablishment status, foreign control status, and other firm characteristics (regressions 2-3). 12 Digging deeper, this result is mainly driven by the positive association between intrafirm offshoring and productivity. We do not find statistical evidence, however, that interfirm offshoring has a positive relation with productivity (regression 4).
Productivity and Offshoring Status
The positive association between offshoring and productivity also depends on the type of business activities that are conducted offshore. Interestingly, service offshoring has a significant positive relation with productivity, whereas the relation with goods offshoring is insignificant (regression 5). Furthermore, within service offshoring, it is mainly the offshoring of provision of services and to a lesser degree the offshoring of knowledge-intensive services that has a positive relation (i.e., software development, data processing, ICT services, engineering and technical services, and R&D services; regression 6). Firms that conduct other services offshore are not more productive than their non-offshoring counterparts.
The coefficients on the control variables generally have the expected signs. Multinationals and especially foreign-controlled firms tend to be more productive than purely domestic firms. In addition, multiestablishment firms are also more productive. However, we find no evidence that older firms are more productive than younger firms. 13 To summarize, the results presented in Table 6 indicate very different associations between firm productivity and a firm's offshoring status, depending on the type of offshoring and the type of business activity offshored. In line with findings for other countries, there is strong statistical evidence of a positive relation between intrafirm offshoring and productivity, but not between interfirm offshoring and productivity. Furthermore, the relation is particularly significant for certain types of service offshoring, but not for goods production offshoring. Table 7 reports the logit estimation results for Equation (2) . Once again, they show that more productive firms are more likely to offshore than less productive ones. Also, in line with hypotheses 1 and 2, they suggest that after controlling for the productivity effect, various types of outward-oriented firms are more likely to offshore than their purely domestic counterparts: foreign-controlled firms, those with a foreign head office, those with foreign subsidiaries, and those that export or attempt to export (regression 1). 14 These results suggest that proximity to other intrafirm activities outside of Canada is a key predictor of offshoring.
Firm-Level Predictors of Offshoring Status
As can be expected, firm size is also a predictor of offshoring. Perhaps counterintuitively, young firms are more likely to conduct offshoring, although the effect is only marginally significant.
Regression 2 in Table 7 shows the nuances of some of these results by showing that only foreign firms with a head office in the United States or Europe are more likely to conduct offshoring. There is no evidence that companies with a headquarter in Asia Pacific and other countries are more likely to offshore. Similarly, although companies that also have a subsidiary in the United States are more likely to engage in offshoring, there is no evidence that this is the case for those with a subsidiary in Europe, Asia Pacific, or other countries. Regression 3 in Table 7 suggests that multinationals, especially foreign-controlled ones, are the most likely to offshore. Table 8 reports the multinomial logit estimation results for the likelihood of conducting intrafirm offshoring, interfirm offshoring, and both. 15 The categories in the regressions are mutually exclusive between the three different groups. Compared with previous results on total offshoring, there are two notable exceptions. First, whereas for intrafirm offshoring the coefficient on foreign head office is significant (regression 1), it is insignificant for interfirm offshoring. Second, the coefficients Note: About 45 percent of observed firms by SIBS (i.e., those in Table 1 Note: The regression estimation is using unweighted data, and the reported standard errors in parentheses are heteroscedasticity consistent. *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. Multinationals and Offshoring: Firm-Level Evidence from Canada S9 doi:10.3138/cpp.2016-069 on the variables foreign subsidiary (regression 1) and US subsidiary (regression 2) are significant for intrafirm offshoring but not for interfirm offshoring. Finally, the much stronger results for intrafirm offshoring than for interfirm offshoring are also visible for multinationals (regression 3). These results suggest that being a Canadian-based subsidiary of a foreign MNE is a particularly important predictor for intrafirm offshoring. Moreover, proximity to other intrafirm activities in the United States seems to be a key predictor of intrafirm offshoring.
Conclusion
Our article contributes to the literature by providing evidence that multinational firms based in Canada are indeed more likely to offshore value chain activities internationally than purely domestic firms. Using a detailed firm-level data set of Canadian-based companies, we find that a firm's multinational status and foreign control are the factors that most significantly affect its probability of conducting a business activity offshore. We find, however, that the results become more nuanced when we consider (a) the type of offshoring (intrafirm and interfirm) and (b) the proximity of a firm to overseas intrafirm operations. First, unsurprisingly, we find that a firm's multinational and foreign ownership status are a significantly more important predictor of intrafirm offshoring than of interfirm offshoring. Second, we show that proximity to other intrafirm activities in neighbouring countries is a key determinant of intrafirm offshoring. 16 In line with our hypotheses, a plausible explanation for these findings is that both domestic and foreigncontrolled multinational firms face lower fixed offshoring costs than other firms. They are more familiar with alternative production possibilities overseas, which reduces the search and development costs of offshoring, and they generally have a more advanced communication system that allows for more effective coordination across business activities that are located in different countries. This fixed cost advantage, however, only seems to span a limited geographical range. Canadian-based multinationals that are located far from other subsidiaries are not more likely to offshore than other firms.
Our analysis has important implications for our understanding of the link between multinational firms and offshoring. Although we find that multinational firms are more likely to offshore production activities than other firms, we show that this is not necessarily because they are less rooted or committed to the local economy. Rather, it may well be because they face a different cost structure that pushes them to self-select into offshoring. Another employment measure, the average labour unit, is also available if it is requested. The average labour unit is derived by dividing the business's annual payroll (from T4) by the corresponding industry-province-size class average annual earnings per employee (from the Survey of Employment Payroll and Hours). Because the imputation is based on average payroll, it will overestimate employment of productive firms and underestimate employment of less productive firms because highly productive firms in general pay high wages. Note, however, that the individual labour unit also has its own shortcomings. It overestimates employment of firms with part-time workers. The problem may be minimized by the introduction of industry dummies in the analysis.
8 Log(MFP) ¼ Log(real gross output) À 0.08 * Log(real capital) À 0.24 * Log(labour) À 0.68 * Log(real intermediate inputs). The coefficients are based on regressions results. 9 Profit can be measured differently, including return to tangible assets or total assets (e.g., for a discussion, see Lafrance 2012) . In this article, we find it is more stable (i.e., fewer extremes or outliers) to use profit as return to total sales, defined as the ratio of net income (before taxes and extraordinary items) to total sales. 10 The restriction is to minimize the problem that net income is not generated from production of normal use of capital, labour, and intermediate inputs. 11 We also perform econometric analyses for other economic variables in Table 5 , controlling for a firm's multinational status, age, firm structure, country of control, exporting or attempting to export, and size. The results suggest that intrafirm offshorers are systematically larger and more capital intensive, pay higher wages, and are more profitable than non-offshorers. It is important to note that these results hold even if multinational and multiestablishment status are included as control variables, suggesting that this result does not merely reflect the fact that intrafirm offshorers are multinationals. Interfirm offshorers also perform better than non-offshorers, but only for employment size and wage rate. There is no evidence that they are more capital intensive and have higher profits. 12 MFP is calculated as the residual of gross output minus the contributions of labour, capital, and intermediate inputs.
Therefore, after controlling for the effects of these inputs, the effects of other variables in the regressions are associated with MFP. 13 In terms of labour productivity, however, young firms tend to be less productive, mainly because they are less capital intensive, as shown in Table 6 . 14 Among 3,761 observations, 35 percent conducted offshoring. Multinationals were the driving force, with 80 percent of multinationals undertaking offshoring compared with 20 percent of non-multinationals. 15 For some cells, the actual coefficient estimates are suppressed because there are fewer than 10 observations associated with these cells. We are only allowed to report the signs and the significance of those estimates. Notably, those cells are entirely associated with firms that only conducted interfirm offshoring. 16 The fact that MNEs with headquarters in Asia Pacific and other countries or non-US subsidiaries are not significant predictive factors for offshoring may be due to the greater physical distance that increases the cost for offshoring, a topic that requires further study.
